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a b s t r a c t
As agents for their patients, providers often make treatment decisions on behalf of patients, and their
choices can affect health outcomes. However, providers operate within a network of relationships and are
agents not only for their patients, but also other health sector actors, such as their employer, theMinistry of
Health, and pharmaceutical suppliers. Providers’ stated preferences for the treatment of uncomplicated
malaria were examined to determine what factors predict their choice of treatment in the absence of in-
formation and institutional constraints, such as the stock of medicines or the patient’s ability to pay.
518 providers working at non-proﬁt health facilities and for-proﬁt pharmacies and drug stores in
Yaoundé and Bamenda in Cameroon and in Enugu State in Nigeria were surveyed between July and
December 2009 to elicit the antimalarial they prefer to supply for uncomplicated malaria. Multilevel
modelling was used to determine the effect of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives on their preference,
while controlling for information and institutional constraints, and accounting for the clustering of
providers within facilities and geographic areas.
69% of providers stated a preference for artemisinin-combination therapy (ACT), which is the rec-
ommended treatment for uncomplicated malaria in Cameroon and Nigeria. A preference for ACT was
signiﬁcantly associated with working at a for-proﬁt facility, reporting that patients prefer ACT, and
working at facilities that obtain antimalarials from drug company representatives. Preferences were
similar among colleagues within a facility, and among providers working in the same locality. Knowing
the government recommends ACT was a signiﬁcant predictor, though having access to clinical guidelines
was not sufﬁcient.
Providers are agents serving multiple principals and their preferences over alternative antimalarials
were inﬂuenced by patients, drug company representatives, and other providers working at the same
facility and in the local area. Efforts to disseminate drug policy should target the full range of actors
involved in supplying drugs, including providers, employers, suppliers and local communities.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The market for health care is characterized by information
asymmetry, as patients delegate decision-making and rely on
providers to select as well as administer treatment (Arrow, 1963).
The performance of providers in low-and-middle-income countries
continues to be scrutinized and there is widespread interest in
strategies to improve their practice (Rowe, de Savigny, Lanata, &
Victora, 2005). In designing interventions to improve the quality
of care it is important to understand what or who inﬂuences pro-
viders’ treatment decisions. Structural factors are often empha-
sized, and providers’ practicemay be constrained by the availability
of essential equipment, supplies and medicines (Peabody,
Taguiwalo, Robalino, & Frenk, 2006), and by shortages of health
professionals, as existing staff care for large volumes of patients and
substitute for more senior cadres (Chen et al., 2004). There is,
q This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike License, which permits non-
commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.
* Corresponding author. Fax: þ44 (0) 20 7927 2701.
E-mail addresses: lindsay.mangham-jefferies@lshtm.ac.uk (L. Mangham-
Jefferies), kara.hanson@lshtm.ac.uk (K. Hanson), wfmbacham@prd.college.eu
(W. Mbacham), obinna.onwujewke@unn.edu.ng (O. Onwujekwe), virginia.
wiseman@lshtm.ac.uk (V. Wiseman).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Social Science & Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/socscimed
0277-9536/$ e see front matter  2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.12.024
Social Science & Medicine 104 (2014) 98e106
however, evidence on providers’ knowledge, competence and
practice demonstrating that poor resource availability and knowl-
edge of clinical guidelines are not the only reasons why patients
receive poor quality care (Das, Hammer, & Leonard, 2008; Willis-
Shattuck et al., 2008).
The literature on medical practice variation examines the
extent to which individual providers affect the quality of patient
care. The notion of ‘practice style’ was introduced to describe the
variation attributed to providers’ preference over alternative forms
of care (Wennberg, Barnes, & Zubkoff, 1982). Early studies focused
on geographic variation, and showed that variations in medical
practice were not fully explained by patients’ health care needs
and demographic characteristics (McPherson, Wennberg, Hovind,
& Clifford, 1982). As the literature grew, studies investigated dif-
ferences between facilities and between individual providers
(Scott & Shiell, 1997a, 1997b). For example, Davis et al. examined
decision-making in primary care facilities and found considerable
variation between doctors in prescribing, referral for diagnostic
tests and follow up having accounted for case-mix, patient, and
practitioner attributes (Davis, Gribben, Scott, & Lay-Yee, 2000).
Although the literature on medical practice variation is reasonably
extensive, it offers limited insight into the extent to which pro-
viders’ preference varies by type of organization. Moreover, most
studies come from high-income countries where facilities are
well-resourced and institutions monitor and regulate the quality
of health care.
Providers’ preference over alternative treatments is said to be
revealed by their actual practice, though the choice of treatment
may be constrained by other factors, such as the stock of medicines,
speciﬁc information about the patient’s condition or the patient’s
ability to pay. Stated preferences are usually used in economic
studies to substitute for revealed preferences under conditions
where it is not possible to capture revealed preferences (because,
for example, the product in question is not available in the market).
However, in some cases it may be useful to focus on stated pref-
erences in their own right, as distinct from revealed preferences.
For instance, focussing on what providers’ state they prefer, rather
than what they know or do, will help to determine whether an
intervention that targets providers’ knowledge is likely to be
effective or whether additional effort is needed to change what
they prefer. In other words, it is acknowledged that changing what
providers prefer may not be sufﬁcient to change actual practice, but
any gap between stated and revealed preference would require
supplementary interventions, such as those that address resource
constraints or reduce the patients’ cost of accessing care.
Providers’ stated preferences for the treatment of uncompli-
cated malaria were examined as part of the formative stages of a
study undertaken to test supply-side interventions to improve
malaria diagnosis and treatment in Cameroon and Nigeria
(Wiseman, Ezeoke, et al., 2012; Wiseman, Mangham, et al., 2012).
Malaria places a considerable burden on the health system in sub-
Saharan Africa, and is treated by providers working at a range of
facilities, including private-sector pharmacies and drug stores. The
clinical guidelines for malaria treatment are unambiguous, and can
be used by providers with limited clinical knowledge or expertise.
Artemisinin-combination therapy (ACT) is the recommended
antimalarial for uncomplicated malaria and should be supplied to
all patients presenting with a fever or history of fever, unless they
have a negative test result or are in the ﬁrst trimester of pregnancy.
ACT has been the ﬁrst-line antimalarial in Cameroon since 2004
and in Nigeria since 2005. In each country, the Malaria Control
Programme of the Ministry of Health, at either national or state
level, is responsible for disseminating malaria policy (Ministry of
Health of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2005; Ministry of Public
Health of the Republic of Cameroon, 2008). Their efforts include
distributing clinical guidelines and holding training workshops.
Providers in public and mission facilities have greater access to
information and training, though professional associations may
conduct training for staff at private-sector pharmacies and drug
stores.
In this paper, we report the type of antimalarial that providers in
Cameroon and Nigeria state they prefer to use to treat uncompli-
cated malaria. We assess whether their stated preference is
consistent with their knowledge of the recommended antimalarial,
and investigate who or what inﬂuences their preference over
alternative antimalarials. Previous epidemiological studies from
Cameroon and Nigeria have investigated the factors associatedwith
patients receiving an ACT, though these studies do not focus on
providers’ preference or practice as they include patients at phar-
macies and drug stores that requested speciﬁc treatment
(Mangham et al., 2012, 2011). Studies from elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa have examined providers’ actual practice in treat-
ing febrile patients, though these were limited to care provided at
public and mission facilities (Osterholt et al., 2006; Rowe et al.,
2000; Zurovac et al., 2004). This paper complements the existing
literature by investigating providers’ preference using stated pref-
erence data obtained from providers working at non-proﬁt health
facilities and for-proﬁt pharmacies and drug stores in Cameroon
and Nigeria.
Theoretical considerations
Providers’ preference over different types of antimalarials was
examined from an economic perspective founded in agency theory.
An agency relationship occurs when one individual acts on behalf
of another (Shapiro, 2005), and this arises in health care in-
teractions, including those at pharmacies and drug stores, when the
patient relies on the provider to determine their health care needs
(Coast, 2001). It is conventional to focus on the principal-agent
relationship between patients and providers, though providers
may be party to multiple agency relationships (Blomqvist, 1991). In
this study, we acknowledge that providers operate within a
network of relationships, and may be an agent not only for their
patients but also for other actors in the health system, such as their
employer, the Ministry of Health, or antimalarial supplier (Jan,
2005). Agency relationships may have a formal contract, though
will often be an unwritten understanding in which the provider
perceives a responsibility to act on behalf of another.
The economics literature assumes agents are rational and make
choices to maximize their own utility. In standard agency theory it
is assumed that agents are ﬁnancially motivated and would act to
obtain an optimal combination of income and leisure time, or at
least achieve a threshold level of income, irrespective of the prin-
cipal’s preference (Evans, 1974). The provider’s preferred treatment
could, therefore, reﬂect the method of remuneration, whether the
organization has a proﬁt motive, or income from additional sources,
such as secondary employment, sales commission, or ownership of
private businesses (Chaix-Couturier, Durand-Zaleski, Jolly, & Dur-
ieux, 2000; Ferrinho, Van Lerberghe, Fronteria, Hipolito, & Biscaia,
2004). These inﬂuences can be considered from a static or dynamic
perspective, with the latter taking into account reputation effects,
inwhich future income depends on the amount of competition and
the principal’s satisfaction with the agent’s current practice
(Mooney & Ryan, 1993). The theory has also been extended to
recognize that providers have a professional responsibility to act in
the interests of the patient and may derive satisfaction from their
work (Mooney & Ryan, 1993). Thus, providers’ choice of treatment
may reﬂect an intrinsic motivation not only to fulﬁl patients’ ex-
pectations and improve patients’ health, but also to satisfy their
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employer, the Ministry of Health or other principals (Leonard &
Masatu, 2010).
Agents’ choice, and therefore their ability to obtain utility, will
be constrained by the information they have available. Providers
may vary in their access to information from pre- or in-service
training, clinical guidelines, public health campaigns, marketing
materials, and observing colleagues. Institutional, social and psy-
chological factors may also constrain preferences. Formal in-
stitutions, such as regulation, can limit behaviour, though informal
institutions can also have an important effect, as preferences are
embedded within social structures, cultures, values and behav-
ioural norms (Burke, Fournier, & Prasad, 2010; Charles, Gafni,
Whelan, & O’Brien, 2006; Rabin, 1998). For instance, providers
may be inﬂuenced by their colleagues, as social networks not only
affect the ﬂow of information but can be a source of reward and
punishment (Granovetter, 2005).
Methods
Econometric model
The econometric analysis is based on random utility theory.
Although utility cannot be directly observed, individuals are
assumed to be economically rational and make choices that
maximize their utility. The provider’s choice of preferred treatment
can be described as:
U ¼ f ðY ; SÞ
where U is the utility of the provider’s preferred treatment, Y is
income (and other ﬁnancial incentives), S is the satisfaction (and
non-ﬁnancial incentives). Utility is maximized subject to the
information about the treatment options and the underlying
institutional environment. It is assumed that the utility yielded
by mutually exclusive treatment options depends on the
observable factors contained in the provider’s utility function
and unobserved or unknown inﬂuences on individual behaviour.
In its simplest form, the observed sources of utility are deﬁned as
a linear expression in which each explanatory variable is
weighted by a parameter that accounts for that variable’s mar-
ginal utility.
A multilevel model was used to estimate a three-level random
effects model (Hox, 2010). This approach accounts for the clustering
of providers, since some correlation between providers within a
facility or area is possible if they have similar incentives, share in-
formation, and face a common institutional environment (Rice &
Jones, 1997). For a three-level logistic regression the dependent
variable pijk is deﬁned as the probability that the preferred treat-
ment was an ACT for provider i from facility j in area k, where (pijk/
(1-pijk)) is the log odds that the preferred treatment is an ACT. The
model for provider’s preferred treatment is speciﬁed as:
logit

pijk

¼ aþ bYijk þ lSijk þ qIijk þ gFjk þ fAk þ εijk þ ujk
þ vk
εijkwN

0; s2

/ujkwN

0; s2

; vkwN

0;42

;
where:
a is the intercept;
Yijk is the income of provider i at facility j in area k;
Sijk is satisfaction of provider i at facility j in area k;
Iijk are information constraints for provider i at facility j in area k;
Fjk are institutional constraints common to all providers at
facility j in area k;
Ak are institutional constraints common to all providers in
area k;
b, l, q, g and f are the parameters associated with the
explanatory variables;
εijk,, ujk and vk, are the residuals at the level of the provider, fa-
cility and geographical area, respectively, and capture unobserved
variation, measurement and speciﬁcation errors.
Study setting
The study was undertaken in four sites in Cameroon and Nigeria
that had been selected for cluster randomized trials of in-
terventions to support the introduction of malaria rapid diagnostic
testing (Wiseman, Ezeoke, et al., 2012; Wiseman, Mangham, et al.,
2012). This paper analyses provider survey data that were collected
as part of a larger study on malaria diagnosis and treatment at
different types of facility and undertaken to guide the design of
interventions that would accompany the roll-out of malaria rapid
diagnostic tests.
The four sites were Yaoundé and Bamenda in Cameroon, and
Enugu and Udi in Enugu State, south-east Nigeria. Yaoundé is the
capital of Cameroon and has an urban, predominately French-
speaking population. The Bamenda site consisted of one urban
and seven rural districts in the North-West region, where the main
language is English or pidgin-English. The urban sites in Nigeria
were drawn from Enugu town, and the rural areas were located in
Udi local government area. Igbo is the dominant ethnic group and
language in Enugu State. Malaria is endemic and occurs throughout
the year in all four sites, though there is seasonal variation in the
Bamenda site, with peak transmission occurring between March
and November.
Antimalarials, including ACT, have over-the-counter status in
Cameroon and Nigeria and can be obtained from pharmacies and
drug stores as well as public, mission and private facilities. Malaria
treatment may also be sought from mobile medicine vendors,
herbalists and traditional healers. The government supplies public
facilities, and mission facilities receive medicines from a central
agency. Pharmacies and drug stores obtain medicines through
formal and informal channels, including drug company represen-
tatives, wholesalers and the main market in the local area.
In Cameroon, public and mission facilities, and private phar-
macies are the main source of treatment for uncomplicated malaria
(Ongolo-Zogo & Bonono, 2010). Most public and mission hospitals
and health centres in the Cameroon sites have a pharmacy and a
laboratory for simple diagnostic procedures and are staffed by
nurses, pharmacy attendants and laboratory technicians. Some
larger facilities also have a medical doctor. In the private-sector,
pharmacies are legally required to employ a qualiﬁed pharmacist
and licensed to sell prescription and over-the-counter medicines. In
addition, antimalarials are available at drug stores in the North-
West region, which are typically owned and staffed by providers
with no or few qualiﬁcations (Reynolds Whyte, van der Geest, &
Hardon, 2002). In Enugu State, Nigeria, treatment for uncompli-
cated malaria is most frequently obtained at public health centres,
pharmacies and drug stores (known as patent medicine stores)
(Onwujekwe et al., 2005). Malaria diagnostic testing is not widely
available at the primary care level and public facilities are staffed by
nurses, community health ofﬁcers and extension workers. For-
proﬁt pharmacies and drug stores are formally recognised in the
health system and have professional associations. Licensed phar-
macies are required to have a qualiﬁed pharmacist, while patent
medicine dealers are not required to have speciﬁc qualiﬁcations or
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training (Okeke, Uzochukwu, & Okafor, 2006) and are formally
restricted from selling prescription-only medicine.
Survey data
Data on providers’ stated preference for treating uncomplicated
malaria were obtained in stratiﬁed multi-stage cluster surveys
conducted at selected facilities in the study sites between July and
December 2009 (Mangham et al., 2012, 2011). The sampling of
geographic areas and facilities was undertaken separately for each
country, based on an enumeration of facilities conducted inMarche
May 2009. At selected facilities a patient exit survey, a provider
survey and a facility audit were conducted. Sample size calculations
were undertaken for the patient exit survey and sought to deter-
mine the proportion of patients supplied ACT, with a given level of
precision (Mangham et al., 2012, 2011). The primary outcome was
the proportion of individuals reporting seeking treatment for a
fever that were supplied (prescribed or received) an ACT. In
Cameroon a survey sample of 12 patients per public facility was
calculated to estimate the primary outcome with a prevision of þ/
8.6%, and eight patients per mission facility and medicine retailer
was calculated to estimate the primary outcome with a precision
ofþ/ 6.2% (Mangham et al. 2012). In Nigeria, a survey sample of 20
patients per public facility was calculated to estimate the primary
outcome with a precision of þ/ 13%, while 14 patients per med-
icine retailer allows the primary outcome to be calculated with a
precision of þ/ 6.6% (Mangham et al. 2011). All of these calcula-
tions assume the intra-cluster correlation in treatment between
facilities was 0.3. These precision estimates differ given the
different sample sizes per type of facility and assume a prevalence
of 50% for the primary outcome.
In each country, geographic areas were randomly selected,
stratiﬁed by site. Facilities dispensing antimalarials were then
selected based on the number and distribution of facilities in each
area. In both countries, all public primary care facilities were
included and pharmacies and drug stores were randomly selected
with probability proportionate to their number in the local area. In
Cameroon, all district hospitals andmission facilities in the selected
areas were also included since they were an important source of
treatment in Yaoundé and Bamenda (though not a major source of
treatment in the Nigerian study sites). The provider survey was
undertaken at all facilities selected for the patient exit survey and
individually administered by trained ﬁeldworkers to all providers
that prescribe or dispense medicines, were available at the time of
the survey and gave informed consent. Most facilities had two or
three providers who prescribed or dispensed treatment, though the
number ranged from one to twelve. In addition, one provider in
each facility completed the facility survey.
Provider and facility questionnaires were administered to obtain
data on provider and facility characteristics, and the health care
available for febrile illness. Providers were asked about their pre-
service and in-service training, access to guidelines, knowledge of
recommended treatment, and preference over different antima-
larials. Providers were asked to state their preference over alter-
native antimalarials prior to questions on training, guidelines and
malaria treatment policy to avoid framing bias that could arise by
referring ﬁrst to the recommended antimalarial. The question-
naires were developed speciﬁcally for the study and pre-tested at
facilities not selected for the survey. Site co-ordinators monitored
and supervised data collection. Data were independently double-
entered and veriﬁed using Microsoft Access 2007 (Microsoft Inc.,
Redmond, Washington). Data entry errors were corrected to ensure
consistency with the original form.
Dependent and explanatory variables
The dependent variable was a binary outcome derived from the
question “which antimalarial do you think is the best for treating
patients with uncomplicatedmalaria?”. Providers could respond by
stating a generic or brand name. Each response was recorded and
subsequently coded: ACT, artemisinin-monotherapy, chloroquine,
sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine, quinine, other, and don’t know. No
provider refused to answer this question. The dependent variable
was 1 if the provider responded ACT and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables occurred at three levels (Table 1). Provider
attributes were at level-1, and included the method of remunera-
tion, based on whether the individual was the owner or an
employee. As providers may yield income from patients obtaining
treatment at a private facility, a variable was included for whether
providers work elsewhere, though we recognized providers may be
unwilling to disclose information relating to their ﬁnancial in-
terests. A binary variable was used to identify providers who re-
ported their patients usually ask for an ACT since providers may
derive satisfaction from fulﬁlling patient expectations. Several
variables indicated providers’ information about ACT, including
whether or not the provider knew ACT was recommended by the
Table 1
Dependent and explanatory variables.
Variable Coding Proportion
Dependent
Stated Preference: ACT is best
type of AM for
uncomplicated malaria
Yes (1)
No (0)
0.69
Explanatory
Level 1: Provider (N[ 518)
Remuneration method: Fixed Salary employee (1)
Sales-related as
owns facility (0)
0.81
Works at other facilities: Yes (1)
No (0)
0.03
Reports patients usually ask for ACT: Yes (1)
No (0)
0.52
Knows ACT is recommended: Yes (1)
No (0)
0.61
Has access to guidelines: Yes (1)
No (0)
0.28
Attended malaria training
in past 3 years:
Yes (1)
No (0)
0.36
Cadre: Doctor (1) 0.06
Nurse or Midwife (2) 0.16
Nurse Assistant (3) 0.05
Health Extension Worker (4) 0.16
Pharmacy or laboratory
technician (5)
0.18
No formal qualiﬁcations
(PMD or attendant) (0)
0.37
Years worked at facility: <1year (0) 0.18
1e4 years (1) 0.34
5e10 years (2) 0.32
11 þ years (3) 0.16
Level 2: Facility (N[ 245)
Facility Ownership: Non-proﬁt Public/
Mission (1)
Private-for-proﬁt
Drug Retailer (0)
0.46
AM supplied by drug
company representative
Yes (1)
No (0)
0.10
Level 3: Area (N[ 36)
Density of facilities: Low (<10 per area) (0) 0.22
Medium (10e19 per
area) (1)
0.37
High (20 þ per area) (2) 0.41
Residence Urban (1)
Rural (0)
0.72
Country: Cameroon (1)
Nigeria (0)
0.71
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government, had access to a copy of the malaria treatment guide-
lines, and attended malaria training in the past three years. Pro-
viders’ cadre was included since pre-service training may have
affected the information they had available, and we controlled for
the number of years worked at a facility.
At the facility level (level-2), a variable indicated whether pro-
viders work in a non-proﬁt organization (owned by the govern-
ment or mission) or in a private-for-proﬁt organization. Facility
ownership may affect the income incentive of providers, or their
employers, though may also reﬂect differences in the information
available and the institutional environment. Whether a facility
received antimalarials from drug company representatives was also
included since they may use ﬁnancial incentives, such as discounts
or commission, to encourage the sale of speciﬁc products, as well as
share information and promotional materials on their products. It
was expected that drug company representatives would promote
ACT over other types of antimalarials.
Area-level (level-3) variables included whether the provider
worked in an urban or rural setting, the density of health facilities
in the locality, and the country. Random effects were used to cap-
ture the degree towhich providers’ preference were clustered since
it was hypothesized that providers working within the same facility
may have similar preferences because they operatewithin the same
institutional context, share information, learn from others and
conform to social norms. Providers’ social network may also extend
to others working in the local area, and for the same reasons may
have similar preferences over different treatments.
Empirical strategy
The ﬁrst step was to analyze stated preference using an
intercept-only model in order to determine the suitability of a
multilevel model over a single-level model and whether to adopt
two or three levels (Hox, 2010). Likelihood ratio tests were used to
compare model ﬁt. The proportion of the total variance that was
attributable to each level of the model was estimated using the
variance partition coefﬁcient (VPC). The VPC is similar to the intra-
cluster correlation, though used when the dependent variable is
discrete. The VPC was calculated as:
VPCfacility ¼

s2facility=s
2
facility þ s2area þ 3:29

and
VPCarea ¼

s2area=s
2
facility þ s2area þ 3:29

where the variance at level 1 was the variance of the standard lo-
gistic distribution (p2/3 ¼ 3.29) (Hox, 2010). Larger values of the
VPC (0 < VPC<1) indicate greater potential for a level to inﬂuence
the value of the dependent variable.
The second step was to estimate a random-interceptmodel with
all explanatory variables at provider, facility and area levels that
were hypothesized may inﬂuence providers’ preference over
alternative antimalarials. The VPC showed the proportion of the
total variance attributable to each level that remained having
incorporated explanatory variables. The third step was to examine
the random-intercept model with interaction terms. Interactions
were investigated for combinations of explanatory variables for
which it was hypothesized there may be a joint effect. Interactions
between facility ownership and information variables were
examined since access to guidelines and training may depend on
the type of facility. Access to guidelines, attendance at training,
cadre, and whether supplies were received from drug company
representatives were each interacted with knowledge that ACT was
the recommended treatment. Finally, interactions were used to
investigate whether provider, facility and area characteristics have
a country-speciﬁc effect. Interactions were added to the random-
intercept model one at a time. The statistical signiﬁcance was
assessed using the Wald test and the likelihood ratio test. Interac-
tion termswere retained in themodel if theywere signiﬁcant at the
10% level.
Multilevel models were estimated using adaptive quadrature to
approximate the marginal likelihood by numerical integration in
Stata 11.2 (StataCorp, 2009). Although computationally demanding,
estimationwith numerical integrationwas the preferredmethod as
there were small cluster sizes at level-2 and quasi-likelihood
methods would be susceptible to bias (Hox, 2010; Rodriguez &
Goldman, 1995). Bootstrap and Bayesian methods are also recom-
mended for small cluster sizes (Hox, 2010), though numerical
integrationwas used as it is well-suited for relatively simplemodels
with binary outcomes (Steele, 2009). Model stability was assessed
by comparing the model estimates from adaptive quadrature with
seven integration points, with those generated by a model using a
higher number of integration points.
Several methods were used to assess model speciﬁcation. The
assumption of normally distributed residuals was examined using
normal plots of standardized level-2 and level-3 residuals. Multi-
collinearity was assessed using the variance inﬂation factor, since
large inﬂation factors show evidence of correlation among
explanatory variables. The deviance, which equals minus two times
the log likelihood, was reported and is an indication of goodness of
ﬁt. The Ramsey RESET test was also used as this is a general test for
problems associated with the functional form (Jones, 2007). It in-
volves taking the square of the predicted value and re-estimating
the model with this as an additional explanatory variable. If the
model is well speciﬁed the new variable will not be signiﬁcant
(Rice, 2000). The RESET test can, therefore, identity speciﬁcation
errors associated with omitted variable bias, simultaneity bias or
measurement error if they lead to nonlinearity in the relationship
between the dependent and explanatory variables. Finally, the
model was estimatedwith andwithout the explanatory variable for
knowing ACT was recommended to investigate the simultaneity
bias that would arise if providers’ preference over alternative an-
timalarials was determined at the same time they acquired
knowledge of the recommended treatment.
The ﬁnal results were validated by re-analysing the ﬁnal model
using Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation
methods in MLwiN 2.25 (Rasbash, Charlton, Browne, Healy, &
Cameron, 2012). The MCMC estimation used uninformative priors
and starting values based on second-order penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL2) generated using restricted iterative generalized
least-squares (RIGLS) (Browne, 2012). Convergence of the Markov
chain was assessed graphically and by checking that similar pos-
terior distribution summaries were achievedwith different starting
values. Again, goodness of ﬁt was assessed using the RESET Test.
Results
The study was based on a population of 518 providers working
at 245 facilities in 36 geographic areas in Cameroon and Nigeria. Of
the 540 providers invited to participate in the survey, 9 refused to
give consent, and 13 had missing data for at least one of the model
variables. The analysis was conducted on complete cases as bias
from missing responses was expected to be small.
The study population included 240 providers from public and
mission facilities and 278 providers from pharmacies and drug
stores, with providers in Cameroon representing 71% of the study
population (Table 1). The majority (81%) of providers were em-
ployees and less than 3% reported working at other facilities. Just
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over half (52%) of the providers reported ACT was the antimalarial
most often requested by patients. Almost two-thirds (61%) of pro-
viders stated ACT was the antimalarial recommended by the gov-
ernment, though only 36% of providers attendedmalaria training in
the past 3 years, and 28% of providers had access to a copy of the
national malaria treatment guidelines. The providers spanned a
range of cadres, though the largest group (37%) were patent med-
icine dealers and sales attendants without formal health qualiﬁ-
cations. The length of time providers had worked at the current
facility ranged from less than one year to more than 11 years.
Overall 69% (359/518) of providers stated ACT was the best
treatment for uncomplicated malaria. Other responses included
quinine and artemisinin-monotherapy, which are recommended
for severe cases of malaria, and sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine,
which was the former ﬁrst-line therapy (Table 2).
Table 3 presents the two-way relationship between providers’
stated preference and their knowledge of the antimalarial recom-
mended by the government for uncomplicated malaria. Overall,
46% (236/518) of all providers surveyed reported ACT was their
preferred treatment and knew it was recommended. There were
24% (123/518) of providers who stated a preference for ACT and did
not know it was the recommended treatment, but also 16% (82/518)
of providers who knew ACT was the recommended treatment and
did not report this was the best treatment.
The degree of variability in providers’ preference that can be
attributed to facility and area levels was examined using intercept-
only models to determine whether to use a two-level and three-
level logistic regression. Signiﬁcant random effects were found at
both levels, and the deviance and likelihood ratio tests indicate that
the three-level model (Model 1 in Table 4) was superior to the two-
level models (Appendix A).
The odds ratios generated by the three-level logistic regression
containing explanatory variables are presented in Table 4. Model 2
included all explanatory variables except the variable “Knows ACT
is the recommended treatment”, while Model 3 included all
explanatory variables. As expected, the introduction of the
explanatory variables reduced the residual variability within facil-
ities and areas (compared to Model 1). Model estimates were stable
to three decimal places. The RESET test indicated Models 2 and 3
were well speciﬁed and there was no evidence of multicollinearity
or simultaneity bias. Model 3 was preferred, based on model di-
agnostics, and was used to investigate interaction terms, though
none were found to signiﬁcantly improve the ﬁt of the model.
The ﬁnal model (Model 3) showed that providers’ stated pref-
erence for an ACT was not signiﬁcantly associated with income
incentives, as measured by the method of remuneration and
whether theyworked elsewhere. Providers were, however, twice as
likely to state a preference for ACT if this was the type of antima-
larial most often requested by their patients. Knowing ACT was the
recommended treatment was also a signiﬁcant determinant, with
the odds of stating a preference for ACT 2.5 times greater amongst
providers who reported ACT was recommended by the govern-
ment. The results also showed the effect of malaria training was of
borderline signiﬁcance, and access to malaria treatment guidelines
did not signiﬁcantly predict a preference for ACT. Providers’ pref-
erence for ACT was signiﬁcantly lower at non-proﬁt facilities, and
the odds of preferring an ACT was 4 times greater if the facility
obtained antimalarials from drug company representatives.
Random effects remained relatively large after the inclusion of
explanatory variables indicating there was unexplained variability
attributable to the facility and local area.
The sensitivity of the results to the estimation method was
investigated by reanalysing the ﬁnal model in MLwiN 2.25 using
PQL2 generated using RIGLS and then by running Bayesian MCMC
using non-informative priors. The results were similar and are
provided in Appendix B.
Discussion
The majority of providers stated a preference over different
types of antimalarials, with just 8% unable or unwilling to state
which antimalarial they prefer for treating uncomplicated malaria.
69% of providers had a preference for ACT, though alternatives
included quinine and artemisinin-monotherapy, which should be
reserved for cases of severe malaria, and sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine, which was the former ﬁrst-line treatment.
Method of remuneration, access to additional employment in-
come, and facility ownership were used as proxies to investigate
the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on providers’ preference. Of these
variables, facility ownership had a signiﬁcant effect, with providers
at for-proﬁt facilities more likely to prefer an ACT over other anti-
malarials. Further research would be required, however, to ascer-
tain whether the effect of facility ownership reﬂects income
incentives or other institutional characteristics.
We found a positive association between providers who stated a
preference for ACT and providers who reported ACT was the anti-
malarial their patients most often request. This suggests that pro-
viders were more likely to prefer ACT if their patients prefer (or
perceive their patients prefer) ACT, though the interpretation is
Table 2
Providers’ stated preference for treatment of uncomplicated malaria.
Country Type of facility All
Cameroon Nigeria Public/Mission Medicine retailer
N ¼ 369 % N ¼ 149 % N ¼ 240 % N ¼ 278 % N ¼ 518 %
ACT 266 72.1 93 62.4 156 65.0 203 73.0 359 69.3
Artemisinin monotherapy 2 0.5 23 15.4 7 2.9 18 6.5 25 4.8
Chloroquine 0 0.0 10 6.7 8 3.3 2 0.7 10 1.9
Quinine 63 17.1 0 0 44 18.3 19 6.9 63 12.2
Sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine 1 0.3 17 11.4 7 2.9 11 4.0 18 3.5
Other AM 0 0.0 4 2.7 2 0.8 2 0.7 4 0.8
No preference 37 10.0 2 1.4 16 6.7 23 8.3 39 7.5
Table 3
Two-way relationship between knowledge of guidelines and preference for ACT.
Stated ACT was the best treatment for
uncomplicated malaria
Yes No Total
N % N % N %
Knows ACT is
recommended
for uncomplicated
malaria
Yes 236 45.6 82 15.8 318 61.4
No 123 23.8 77 14.9 200 38.6
Total 359 69.3 159 30.7 518 100.0
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uncertain. For example, providers may derive utility from selecting
ACT, either because they have an intrinsicmotivation to satisfy their
patients, or because they want to maintain a good reputation and
secure future income. Local competition would also be expected to
affect the latter, though there was no evidence that the density of
facilities within an area had an effect on providers’ preference.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the association reﬂects an
omitted exogenous factor, such as a public health campaign, that
had an inﬂuence on both providers’ and patients’ preference. Either
way, knowing that preferences were positively associated may be
useful for designing strategies to improve providers’ practice or
inﬂuence patients’ demand.
It was encouraging, and not unexpected, to ﬁnd providers who
knew ACT was the recommended treatment for uncomplicated
malaria were signiﬁcantly more likely to state a preference for ACT.
Moreover, providers that had attended malaria training in the past
three years were more likely to state a preference for ACT (at the
10% level of signiﬁcance) having controlled for their knowledge.
This suggests training can have an effect that goes beyond
informing providers about treatment policy and can inﬂuence their
preferences over different treatments. Access to malaria treatment
guidelines had no signiﬁcant effect on providers’ preference, even
in the model which did not control for their knowledge. This sug-
gests having access to guidelines is not a good predictor that pro-
viders will supply the recommended treatment. The results imply,
therefore, that the nature of communication can have an important
inﬂuence on providers’ preference and further research on this may
help to identify effective strategies for educating providers about
changes in health policy and clinical guidelines.
The results suggest an agency relationship in which drug com-
pany representatives (drug reps) inﬂuence providers’ preference
over antimalarials, though it is also possible that obtaining medi-
cines from drug reps may proxy for unobserved organizational
attributes. If there is a direct effect, then this could reﬂect explicit
incentives, such as sales commission, or an information effect from
marketing strategies that promote the use of ACT. The interaction
between knowledge that ACT is recommended by the government
and use of drug reps did not signiﬁcantly improve themodel, which
suggests drug reps have an effect that is independent of providers’
knowledge of the recommended treatment, though the sample
from which to detect interaction effects was limited. In any case,
there may be merit in exploring the potential to engage drugs reps
Table 4
Factors predicting providers’ stated preference for ACT.
Fixed effects MODEL 1: Intercept-only model MODEL 2: With all explanatory
variables except knowledge
MODEL 3: With all explanatory
variables
OR SE P-value OR SE P-value
Level 1: Provider
Remuneration method: Fixed salary 1.46 0.712 0.434 1.63 0.794 0.320
Sales related Ref Ref
Additional employment: Yes 1.94 1.928 0.507 2.04 2.054 0.477
No Ref Ref
Reports patients usually
ask for ACT:
Yes 2.17 0.737 0.023 2.08 0.710 0.033
No Ref Ref
Has access to guidelines: Yes 2.06 0.901 0.100 2.04 0.900 0.106
No Ref Ref
Has attended malaria training: Yes 1.96 0.662 0.047 1.88 0.638 0.061
No Ref Ref
Knows ACT is recommended: Yes e e e 2.54 0.824 0.004
No Ref
Cadre: Doctor 1.18 0.907 0.127 0.79 0.613 0.147
Nurse or Midwife 2.21 1.308 1.96 1.160
Nurse Assistant 1.37 1.047 1.16 0.888
Extension Worker 0.72 0.392 0.61 0.336
Pharmacist/technician 0.58 0.296 0.55 0.281
No qualiﬁcations Ref Ref
Years worked at facility: <1 year Ref 0.440 Ref 0.406
1e4 years 0.81 0.373 0.74 0.346
5e10 years 0.53 0.257 0.50 0.241
11 þ years 0.95 0.555 0.88 0.517
Level 2: Facility
Ownership: Public/Mission 0.40 0.248 0.140 0.33 0.205 0.075
Drug Retailer Ref Ref
AM supplied by drug
company rep
Yes 5.77 4.858 0.037 4.83 4.048 0.060
No Ref Ref
Level 3: Area
Density of facilities: Low Ref 0.809 Ref 0.872
Medium 0.99 0.800 0.97 0.798
High 1.58 1.514 1.43 1.397
Residence Urban 1.24 1.030 0.793 1.44 1.225 0.666
Rural Ref Ref
Country Cameroon 1.99 1.281 0.283 1.81 1.188 0.366
Nigeria Ref Ref
Random Effects Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Residual variance Level-2: s2 (uj) 2.94 1.224 2.64 1.206 2.486 1.170
Level-3: s2 (vjk) 1.66 0.862 1.29 0.768 1.427 0.817
VPC: Level-2: facility 0.377 0.366 0.345
Level-3: area 0.209 0.179 0.198
Diagnostics
Deviance (2*llh) 577.074 536.568 527.868
RESET e 0.249 0.278
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in strategies to change providers’ preference and improve their
practice. There are few examples in the empirical literature, though
a vendor-to-vendor education programme in Kenya, in which
wholesalers were trained to supply providers at drug shops and
kiosks with information and job aids on malaria treatment, was
found to have a moderate effect (Tavrow, Shabahang, & Makama,
2003).
There is evidence that providers’ preference for ACT was similar
among colleagues within a facility and among providers within a
local area. Although the level-2 and level-3 residual variance was
reduced by the inclusion of explanatory variables, it remained
signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal model and the VPC indicated that a sub-
stantial proportion of the unexplained heterogeneity can be
attributed to facility and area factors. This may reﬂect the inﬂuence
of institutional and behavioural factors, such as networks and social
norms, though we are cautious in drawing conclusions since
average cluster size was small and the size of the random effect
depends on the estimation method. Further research would be
beneﬁcial to explore how preferences may be shaped or con-
strained by colleagues, and how strategies to improve providers’
practice could utilize networks or promote social norms.
There are some methodological limitations to our work. First,
there is uncertainty in how providers understood the question used
to elicit their preference over alternative antimalarials. The ques-
tion “which antimalarial do you think is best for treating uncom-
plicated malaria?” followed questions on the type of antimalarial
usually supplied and type of antimalarial patients’ prefer. It is
possible, however, that some providers understood the question to
be asking about the efﬁcacy of different antimalarials, or aspects of
the treatment regimen, such as the number of tablets, or potential
side effects. If this were the case, thenwewould expect the effect of
income and satisfaction on their choice of treatment to be reduced
as providers focus on other attributes. Qualitative methods may be
useful to probe what providers understand by ‘best’ in this context.
Moreover, it is possible that our direct method of eliciting stated
preference encouraged providers to give a socially acceptable
response and report what they know is recommended. More so-
phisticated methods, such as discrete choice experiments, are often
used and designed to overcome this framing bias. The direct
method was, however, practical given that the formative research
sought to examine multiple questions about the treatment of un-
complicated malaria, and was also feasible since ACT was not a new
product.
Second, the sample size was restricted because the provider
survey was conducted as part of a larger study principally designed
to examine the treatment supplied to febrile patients. None of the
interactions included in the model were found to have a signiﬁcant
effect, and this may be due to the limited number of observations.
Furthermore, the average cluster size at level-2 was small since the
survey involved many primary care facilities and medicine retailers
that operate with few, sometimes lone, providers. In this setting,
the small cluster sizes could not have been overcome and theywere
an important consideration for the statistical analysis. Correlation
between providers within a facility was empirically investigated to
determine whether facility should be included as a level in the
model. There remained evidence of clustering at the facility-level
(as well as the area-level) once explanatory variables were added
to the model. In addition, the robustness of the study results to the
estimation method was investigated because of the small cluster
sizes at the facility-level. The alternative methods generated com-
parable results, though the small cluster sizes may have explained
the differences in the magnitude of estimated coefﬁcients. This is
consistent with ﬁndings from a recent study which showed how
the choice of estimation method and software can affect the results
of multilevel logistic regression when the data are limited and the
average cluster size is small (Li, Lingsma, Steyerberg, & Lesaffre,
2011).
Conclusions
Ensuring providers prefer to supply the recommended type of
antimalarial is an important prerequisite for ensuring patients with
uncomplicated malaria receive the most effective treatment. Pro-
viders were asked which antimalarial they think is the best for
treating patients with uncomplicated malaria to elicit which anti-
malarial providers prefer to supply when not constrained by the
resources available or patients’ ability to pay, and we investigated
who or what inﬂuences their preference. The type of antimalarial
providers prefer not only depended on their knowledge of the
clinical guidelines, but also reﬂected their perceptions of what
patients prefer, and the inﬂuence of drug company representatives,
their colleagues and other providers in the locality. These ﬁndings
support the premise that providers are agents serving multiple
principals. Understanding who and what inﬂuences providers’
stated preference over alternative antimalarials is useful for iden-
tifying strategies to encourage providers to supply effective malaria
treatment. The inﬂuence of multiple actors on the providers’ choice
of treatment emphasizes the need to communicate changes in drug
policy not only to providers but also to suppliers and local com-
munities. Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that public health in-
terventions would be more effective if they target groups of
providers, rather than individuals, and promote a supportive
environment since providers working within a facility or local area
have similar preferences.
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